

Summary

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Summary

Toward the 22nd-Century World Philosophy (II)

Hideo KAWAMOTO

Philosophy has long been conducted with the logic innate to everyday language as a basis. As for the responsible for the conception of several core concepts of philosophy, Aristotle initiated this historical trend. However, numerous phenomena do not fall within the realm or logic of everyday language. In those instances, philosophy must diverge from this established model. Here, we sought a model case of self-organization in a broad sense and considered a type of philosophy directed at examining the workings of experiences with that as a foundation. This seemed to be the best option at present for reining in the phenomena of our world today. Within this framework, the topic transitions to the emergence of a new actuality. Not only does this introduce original partial elements, but the work becomes the practical exercises of recomposing the relationship between the parts and the whole in each case. For the time being, the history of the philosophy, information, and environmental systems comprise primary themes of the world philosophy.

Prosocial Behavior and Educational Robots

Akiko ARAI, Kazuya MATSUURA

Recently, some scholars in robotics have tried to introduce social robots to educational sites. These robots, however, if it were to actualize in most society, might cause ethical and educational problems. This article aims to clarify the part of these problems, especially in the case of care-receiving robots, by evaluating them from the psychological perspective of the development of prosocial behavior in children. Consequently, we will find that there lies a serious gap on “teaching” and “learning” between educators and scholars in robotics.

Practice of Suicide Prevention Based on the Philosophy of the Absurd

Dai IWASAKI

Contemplating the role of philosophy in suicide prevention, which requires a comprehensive approach, I propose the practice of suicide prevention based on Camus's philosophy of the Absurd. Traditionally, philosophical debates on suicide have focused on its permissibility with little practical utility for its prevention. However, if philosophy is able to address suicidal people's ambivalent psychology of "wanting to live" and "wanting to die," it can overcome the communication problems that suicidal people encounter when discussing the suffering of life with experts or those around them. Furthermore, the philosophical effort to acknowledge suffering as a primordial absurdity and assign a unique meaning to it, instead of alleviating it, and the related environmental improvement open up new possibilities, different from the conventional practice of suicide prevention.

The Concept of Responsibility in Indian Philosophical Tradition

Takahiro KATO

Philosophers in Indian tradition did not address the same topics as Western philosophers have addressed in their tradition. This is the case with the concept of responsibility. This does not mean, however, that Indian philosophers did not consider such topics or have such conceptions. Rather, we should say that they have viewed these topics and conceptions from different perspectives.

In Indian tradition, thinkers accept the law of *karma*, which is perhaps regarded as a version of fatalism, and they suppose at the same time that they can change the way that the law of karma will affect the future. This compatibilistic viewpoint assumes that we are responsible for our actions because we have a decision to make regarding whether to perform an action or avoid it. This notion is a close synonym for "the principle of alternate possibilities." Once we admit the possibility that our decision is the intermediary by which we are able to act otherwise, we must also accept that we are responsible for what we have decided to do and what we have actually done. We have no freedom in the sense of doing things at will. However, we at least have our own decisions to do or avoid something. Therefore, we are partly predetermined and restricted in the freedom to choose. Due to this restricted freedom, we are fully responsible for our decisions.

An Example of a Revision of Tibetan Translation: From *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*

Toshio HORIUCHI

The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (ASVy) is basically a combination of Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and its commentary (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*). Tibetan translations of the three works were completed by the great translator Ye shes sde, but ASVy alone was revised several hundred years later by Nyi ma rgyal mtshan dpal bzang po. It is usually impossible to determine the differences between the original and the revised versions, because the originals (before revision) are usually not available. However, by applying a certain procedure to ASVy, we were able to clarify his revisions at the time. In this paper, I will clarify the characteristics and degree of the revisions made to ASVy, and explain exactly how the revision of the translated Tibetan literature was conducted.

Habitualität in Aktivität und Passivität nach Husserl

Hayato MASUDA

Die Habitualität in unserer Lebenswelt wird in der intersubjektiven Umwelt gebildet. Die Selbstverständlichkeit dieser Genesis der Habitualität muss aber transzendental phänomenologisch begründet werden. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich den Begriff der Habitualität in der Phänomenologie Husserls unter dem Aspekt der Erweckung der Instinktintentionalität und der Entwicklung des Ich-Bewusstseins im Zusammenhang mit der Analyse des inneren Zeitbewusstseins aufzufassen. Durch solche genetischen Analysen wird es möglich zu zeigen, wie tief die Habitualität in uns, sogar in unserem Unbewusstsein wurzelt.

In §1 dieses Aufsatzes wird zunächst dargestellt, dass die Habitualität Husserls die zwei Entwicklungsstufen der Passivität und der Aktivität aufweist. In §2 wird die Habitualität unter dem Begriff der „Assoziation“ der passiven Synthesis, von den zwei Aspekten der reproduktiven Assoziation der Wiedererinnerung und der „Urassoziation“ der lebendigen Gegenwart her analysiert. In §3 betrachte ich den Unterschied zwischen dem Begriff des Gedächtnisses und dem der Habitualität. Schließlich wird in §4 die genetische Entwicklung von der passiven zu der aktiven Habitualität unter dem Aspekt des Unterschieds zwischen der instinktiv passiven Kinästhesie in der Urassoziation und der aktiven Kinästhesie durch die Wiedererinnerung der Ichaktivität thematisiert.

Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, zunächst die dreistufige Einordnung des Begriffs der Habitualität Husserls genetisch phänomenologisch, d.h. nach der Gesetzmäßigkeit von Zeitbewusstsein, Assoziation und Urstiftung, darzustellen und zweitens das Fundierungsverhältnis zwischen der passiven Habitualität und der aktiven Habitualität zu erhellen.

Goethe and Robert Boyle (1627-1691)

An outline of the investigation into the history of scientific methodology

Kazunari HATA

The way in which Goethe relates to Robert Boyle is one of the most crucial topics in Goethe research, because Goethe mentions Boyle besides Theophrastus as the most important scientist in the history of the colour theory. In fact, Goethe's science has been influenced by Boyle in many aspects: in the recording of all succeeded and failed experiments, in the application of the hypothesis as a heuristic method and in the unsystematic theory with the variable principle. Boyle exerts strong influence on Goethe in fields ranging from the scientific method to the fundamental view of scientific activity itself. However, at present there is no treatise that focuses exclusively on the significance of Boyle in Goethe's natural science. Instead the comparison of Goethe with Newton is repeatedly taken up as a topic, as Goethe severely criticized Newton's optics. The leitmotiv of this comparison recurrently explains that Goethe rejects the concept of modern science. Nevertheless, Boyle is the representative virtuoso of modern science, who had initiated experimental science. If Goethe, as the usual interpretation indicates, is simply standing in confrontation to modern science, it cannot be consistently explained why Goethe approved Boyle.

This theme reveals the primal content of Goethe's natural science and at the same time it provides a new perspective on the disjunction between Goethe and Newton in the history of science. The crux of Goethe's critique of Newton lies in the conception of the experiment. Goethe denies Newton's exclusive verification of theory with the *experimentum crucis*. Yet it had been Boyle who had established this concept of the *experimentum crucis*. He exerts strong influence on Newton and Goethe not only through his concept of the experiment, but also through his usage of the hypothesis and the principles of science. To understand the essence of Goethe's natural science and the differentiation between Goethe and Newton, the triad of Goethe, Newton and Boyle must indispensably be taken into consideration.

Therefore, it must be investigated which scientific program underlies Boyle's experimental science, and how Goethe and Newton differ from each other based on this approach. Herein lies a fundamental theme of science and philosophy: the relation between *theoria* and *poiesis*. The demonstration of theory through experiment entails a connecting point between abstract theory and artistic or technical creation (*poiesis*), because the experimental science is the very activity that intermediates between the mere speculative idea and the concrete phenomenon produced by human action. The investigation of the triad of Goethe, Newton and Boyle thus discloses an early moment within the history of science regarding the unification of *theoria* and *poiesis*.

The Manner of Being of What Exists in the Human Mind: Descartes and Nominalism

Takeshi OHNO

According to Descartes, a cause is essential for an idea to be formed, but Caterus considered an idea to be an intellection (*intellectio*) or a conceptual being (*ens rationis*) and refuted that a cause is not necessary for the formation of an idea. So far this conflict has mostly been understood as “Thomism” (Caterus) versus “Scotism” (Descartes), but Caterus’ theory of idea is Ockhamistic. Both Ockham and Caterus considered an idea to be a conceptual being and at the same time a real being (*ens reale*). According to Descartes, however, an idea is not a conceptual being but a real one. Thus, both Caterus and Descartes have a point in common that what exists in the mind is a real being. However, their bases for the reality of an idea are different. For Ockham, a concept depends on the mind that is its subject or on the representative object, but for Descartes it depends on the representative content of idea itself or on the manner of being of idea. Therefore, it is evident that for Descartes the idea is a real being in itself.

Why Does Nature Evolve “Pluralistically”?

Takashi OKINAGA

In my article last year, I examined the pluralism in William James’s theory of truth—that knowledge gained from observation can always be explained from multiple worldviews and that the worldview for which one stands depends on one’s “temperament.” In other words, “nature” is pluralistic. However, this pluralistic theory of truth can be seen as mere “voluntarism” when the interpretation is made that logical investigation has not been completed before the advent of “temperament.”

With respect to the impossibility of completion of this investigation, Quine’s Indeterminacy of Translation thesis demonstrates that regarding the meaning of a word in an unknown language, no matter how much one observes a native person’s actions associated with it, there is still room for judgment based on the linguist’s intuition. This leads to an under-determinacy of theory. Further, Wittgenstein’s language-game theory shows that any rule can be applied for a given statement, that there is no basis for applying a given rule, and that herein lays the functional significance of the *Weltbild* or world-picture.

The under-determinacy of theory and the varied possibilities of applying rules indicate that James’s pluralistic theory of truth is still valid even after exhausting logical investigations. This means that even after exhausting scientific exploration, “nature” is still not confined to monism but evolves pluralistically.

Empirical Pragmatism and its Potential: Toward Deepening “Inquiry”

Tasuku FUJISAKA

This paper is an attempt to present the potential of the thought of pragmatism rooted in the development of practical experience. The thought of pragmatism, since its proponent Peirce, has led to the formation of original theories such as the fallibilistic theory of truth and even plastic realism (especially William James), using "inquiry" as a model case of experience. This led Richard Rorty to develop his own pragmatism, rooted in "anti-foundationalism," "anti-essentialism," and "anti-representationalism. However, since the objectivity that Peirce had once emphasized in his theories of inquiry was neglected in these theories, Rorty were thoroughly criticized by modern theorists (New Pragmatists) such as Cheryl Misak. However, defending pragmatism's theory of truth as an attempt to build a system of knowledge based on universality may overlook the potential that pragmatism originally possessed. Therefore, in this paper, I will go back to Rorty and refer to his successor, Hilary Putnam's theory of reality, with the aim of illuminating the potential of pragmatism based on experience. In the end, it will be found that empirical pragmatism has the potential to be a theory of deepening inquiry that is in line with Deleuze's transcendental empiricism.